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In the New Keynesian model, even if the central bank does not have an over-ambitious
output target, policy under discretion leads to an ineﬃciency known as the stabilisation
bias. In this paper, using a New Keynesian model, we explore and quantify how various un-
certainties such as an information lag, a cost channel and multi-period data revisions aﬀect
the size of the stabilisation bias. When an information lag is introduced in an otherwise
standard New Keynesian model, we ﬁnd that the size of the stabilisation bias is consider-
ably reduced. The presence of a cost-channel in the model, on the other hand, increases
the stabilisation bias signiﬁcantly. Finally, multi-period revisions to output and inﬂation,
reduces the ineﬃciency associated with discretionary policy.
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How important is commitment in the New Keynesian (NK) model? According to the recent
literature on monetary policy, there are signiﬁcant gains if a central bank can credibly anchor
inﬂation expectations through a commitment to a low inﬂation target. Moreover, there are
beneﬁts from commitment even in the absence of an average inﬂation bias as policy under
discretion in the NK model remains ineﬃcient since it generates a stabilisation bias. Unlike
the inﬂation bias that aﬀects the steady-state level of inﬂation, the stabilisation bias is a
dynamic ineﬃciency that inﬂuences the ability of policy-makers to stabilize inﬂation through
time. This bias emerges because of insuﬃcient inertia in the policy actions of the central
bank and is typically characterized by an excessive stabilisation of output at the expense of
inﬂation.
As discussed in Woodford (2003), when the behaviour of private agents is forward-
looking, optimal monetary policy under commitment exhibits a considerable degree of in-
ertia. The reason why an inertial policy is optimal is simple: if private agents believe that
the central bank will keep the short-term interest rate above its neutral value, even long
after the (cost-push) shock has passed, they will lower their expectations of future inﬂation.
This shift in expectations will have a favourable impact on the current period inﬂation
as expected future inﬂation is an important driver of current inﬂation in the NK model.
This expectations channel is, however, absent under discretion since the central bank, by
not making any promises on future actions, cannot aﬀect the public’s expectations about
future inﬂation. As a result, the central bank, under discretion, faces a less favourable
output-gap–inﬂation trade-oﬀ, resulting in a stabilisation bias.
Most studies on the stabilisation bias have focused on the importance of forward versus
backward-looking inﬂation expectations. It is clear that the gains from commitment in the
NK model are largely dependent on the forward-looking nature of inﬂation. This point
is explicitly formulated in Clarida et al. (1999), Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2006) and some
other studies. However, there are other factors, such as the persistence of the cost-push
shock and the slope of the Phillips curve that aﬀect the size of the stabilisation bias in
the NK model. Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2006) and Tillman (2009) show that commitment
becomes more important if the cost-push shock is more persistent and if the NK Phillips
curve becomes ﬂatter. This result is intuitive. In both cases, the central bank faces a less
favourable output-gap inﬂation trade-oﬀ, resulting in a larger stabilisation bias and thusincreasing the value of commitment.
Although the literature has extended the basic NK model in numerous directions to
include features such as information lags, cost-channel, real rigidities and various forms
of uncertainty, there are very few studies that have examined the implications of these
extensions on the role of commitment and the size of the stabilisation bias. One notable
exception is Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2006). They evaluate the importance of commitment
in three empirical models of the NK type, notably the models of Fuhrer and Moore (1995),
Orphanides and Wieland (1998) and Rudebusch (2002). These models feature backward
and forward-looking expectations and lags in the transmission of monetary policy in the
model of Rudebusch (2002). They ﬁnd that the size of the stabilisation bias depends on the
degree of forward and backward-looking expectations in the model as previously stressed
by Clarida et al. (1999). Moreover, they also report that the importance of commitment is
greatly reduced in models that feature a delayed response of monetary policy arising from
a transmission and an information lag as in the model of Rudebusch (2002).
In this paper, we explore and quantify the importance of commitment and the size of
the stabilisation bias by considering some of the recent extensions to the basic NK model.
Our paper is thus related to Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2006) but diﬀers in three important
ways. First, all the models we employ are microfounded and nested. The models they
utilize are to a large extent ad-hoc and non-nested. Second we modify the standard NK
model, in turn, to include a lag in the information set, a cost channel and an observational
uncertainty in the form of noisy information on output and inﬂation. Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om
(2006) consider only models that include information as well as transmission lags. We
choose these three extensions as they have been the subject of many recent studies in
the NK literature and have been shown to be theoretically and empirically important.2
Moreover, for each extension, we examine the size of the stabilisation bias for various degrees
of inﬂation expectations and not just for completely forward-looking or backward-looking
models. Third, we provide analytical results whenever possible and not just numerical
simulations.
We ﬁnd that the size of the stabilisation bias and thus the importance of commitment
are greatly reduced when the model features a delayed response of monetary policy in the
2For example, see Ravenna and Walsh (2006) on the cost channel, Woodford (2003) on models with de-
layed eﬀects of monetary policy and Gerali and Lippi (2003) and Ehrmann and Smets (2003) on measurement
errors.form of an information lag. Even when inﬂation expectations are very forward-looking, the
gains from commitment are very small. This ﬁnding is similar to the result Dennis and
S¨ oderstr¨ om (2006) found using the Rudebusch (2002) model, albeit in a model where inﬂa-
tion expectations are not completely forward-looking. When we introduce a cost channel,
we ﬁnd a substantial increase in the size of the stabilisation bias. Moreover, in this model,
we ﬁnd that the stabilisation bias remains fairly large even when inﬂation expectations are
completely backward-looking. This result holds as long as consumers are optimizers in the
model. In the model with observational uncertainty in the form of measurement errors on
output and inﬂation, we ﬁnd that the gains from commitment are smaller compared to the
baseline model. The size of the stabilisation bias decreases as the size of the revisions to
output and inﬂation increases. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe
the diﬀerent NK models. Section 3 characterizes optimal policy in each model. Section 4
presents our numerical results and section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model consists of a continuum of identical households with an inﬁnite planning hori-
zon, a monetary authority that either commits to a policy or operates under discretion,
monopolistic competitive ﬁrms, sluggish price adjustment, rule of thumb price setters and
optimizing consumers. We assume this asymmetry in the model purely because the presence
of rule of thumb consumers is not an important determinant of the size of the stabilisation
bias and can thus be ignored. On the other hand, the existence of rule of thumb price
setters will give rise to a NK Phillips curve that has backward and forward-looking inﬂa-
tion expectations. The importance of commitment, as we will see, will depend to a large
extent on the degree of forward versus backward-looking expectations about inﬂation in the
model.3
The model diﬀers from the standard New Keynesian model as we assume that expendi-
ture decisions may be predetermined. Moreover, we have a binary parameter in the model
that determines whether there is a cost channel or not. Apart from these features, our model
is a stylized New Keynesian framework that has been extensively studied (see Walsh (2003)
for example). We ﬁrst present the micro-foundations of our nested models and subsequently
3We have performed numerical simulations with a version of the model that also features rule of thumb
consumers. Our results do not depend on the rule of thumb consumers but depend on the rule of thumb
producers. For this reason, we have this asymmetry in the model.discuss the diﬀerent versions we utilize. Since the features of our model follow closely those
of Amato and Laubach (2003) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006), we only provide an overview
of its derivations.

















where β ∈ (0,1) denotes the discount factor, Ct a consumption basket, Nt hours worked
from which the agent derives disutility, σ−1 the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
ϕ−1 the labour supply elasticity and ξt is a preference shock. The main diﬀerence between
this model and the basic New Keynesian model is that expectations may be conditional on
information up to an including t-d and not t, reﬂecting the fact that expenditure decisions
are predetermined. In the basic New Keynesian model, d = 0, whereas in the model
with an information lag where expenditures are predetermined, we set d = 1. Aggregate











where i indexes diﬀerentiated goods and α denotes the elasticity of substitution among the
















Households face a cash in advance constraint in this model. They enter each period with
an amount of cash Mt and they also receive their wage income NtWt at that time, where Wt
denotes the nominal wage rate. They use their resources to purchase goods PtCt and use
the remaining cash to make a deposit Dt at the ﬁnancial intermediary. This deposit earns
a gross nominal interest Rt. The ﬁnancial intermediary in the model uses the deposits and
an exogenous cash injection to ﬁnance the borrowing needs of ﬁrms. Nominal consumption
is assumed to be fully ﬁnanced with cash. The cash-in advance constraint is given by:
PtCt ≤ WtNt + Mt − Dt (5)Households are assumed to own the ﬁrms and ﬁnancial intermediaries and money ﬂows back
to the households in the form of dividend and/or proﬁt payments. Thus the nominal income
of households is composed of wage income WtNt, interest income earned on deposits RtDt,
proﬁts earned from ﬁnancial intermediaries and ﬁrms, Ft. A typical household expenditure
consists of consumption and money balances that are carried forward to the next period.
Thus the household budget constraint is given by:
Mt+1 = Mt + WtNt + RtDt + Ft − PtCt − Dt (6)
In our model, since there is no government expenditure, goods market clearing requires that
Yt = Ct.





















PtCt = WtNt + Mt − Dt (9)
Where the ﬁrst-order conditions respectively describe the optimal savings/consumption,
labour supplydecisions and the cash-in-advance constraint. Using the optimal savings/consumption
condition from our maximization problem and substituting the resource constraint gives the
familiar Euler equation. The log-linearized version yields the intertemporal IS:
yt = Et−dyt+1 −
1
σ
[Et−dRt − Et−dπt+1] +
1
σ
[ξt − Et−dξt+1] (10)
where lower case variables denote the percent deviations from steady state, π the growth
rate of the aggregate price index.
2.1 Firms
To model the price dynamics, we use Calvo’s (1983) framework of staggered price setting.
The model is described in detail in many papers and it has become the workhorse framework
in the NK literature. We assume that a fraction (1 − ω) of suppliers can reset their price
at the end of any given period. We introduce two assumptions that are diﬀerent from the
standard NK model. First, the assumed timing is diﬀerent. In the model, the optimal price
chosen by ﬁrms takes eﬀect one period later. Firms must decide their prices at time t based
on old information t − 1. Absent this timing issue, we revert back to the baseline model.The second diﬀerence that we introduce is regarding how ﬁrms ﬁnance their wage-bill. We
assume that ﬁrms may need to borrow to pay nominal wages. If this is the case, then a
cost-channel of monetary policy arises in the model. Obviously, if ﬁrms never borrow in
this model, we again revert back to the baseline model. We introduce a binary parameter
γ that indexes whether or not there is a cost channel in the model.
Firms are assumed to produce a continuum of goods and operate in a monopolistically
competitive market with decreasing returns to scale. The model abstracts from capital and
assumes that the production function is given by:
Yit = AtNit (11)
where At is a technology shock and each ﬁrm is indexed by the subscript i. The real











The superscript γ is an index indicating whether there is a cost channel or not in the model.
Setting γ = 0 indicates that there is no cost channel of monetary policy, whereas setting
γ = 1 indicates the presence of a cost channel. Using the ﬁrst order condition for the
labour supply, the production function and the resource constraint, we can show that the
log-linearized expression for the real marginal cost can be expressed as:
ψt = (ϕ + σ)yt + γRt (13)
We make the same assumptions as in Amato and Laubach (2003) and postulate that
the fraction of ﬁrms that are allowed to change their price, that is (1−ω), do so optimally.
However, only a proportion of these ﬁrms (1 − ν) reset their prices optimally while the
other proportion ν choose to optimize their price by setting it to last period’s prices. These
rule of thumb producers simply update their pricing by choosing the previous price level.
Moreover, as previously discussed, we allow for predetermined pricing decisions and we
assume that the price chosen by ﬁrms that are allowed to change their prices takes eﬀect
one period later. The log-linearized aggregate price index can therefore be written as a
combination of ﬁrms that can and cannot change their prices:
pt = ωpt−1 + (1 − ω)¯ p∗
t (14)
where ¯ p∗
t is the log-linearized price index of prices set in period t
¯ p∗
t = νpb
t + (1 − ν)p
f
t (15)where the rule-of-thumb ﬁrms are denoted by the superscript b and the optimizing ﬁrms
by the superscript f. The log-linearized index of prices is thus a convex combination of the
prices set by the optimizing and forward-looking ﬁrms, the rule-of-thumb ﬁrms and ﬁrms
that cannot change their prices.
As discussed in Amato and Laubach (2003) and Walsh (2003), the forward-looking price




t = (1 − βω)Et−d(ψt + pt) + βωEt−dp
f
t+1 (16)
Note that because the price chosen takes one period to take eﬀect, we have this diﬀerent
timing for expectations. The rule-of-thumb ﬁrms are assumed to set their prices according
to the average price in the previous period corrected for past inﬂation. Thus, we obtain the
log-linearized pricing decisions of the rule-of-thumb producers:
pb
t = ¯ p∗
t−1 + πt−1 (17)
where past inﬂation serves as the forecast for actual inﬂation. Using equations (14)-(17),
we can derive the following hybrid NK Phillips curve.
πt = γfEt−dπt+1 + γbπt−1 + κEt−dψt (18)
Using the expression we derived for log linearized version of real marginal cost, we obtain
our hybrid NK Phillips curve with a cost channel:
πt = γfEt−dπt+1 + γbπt−1 + κEt−d [(ϕ + η)yt + γRt] + et (19)
κ =
(1 − ν)(1 − ω)(1 − βω)
ω + ν(1 − ω(1 − β))
γf =
βω
ω + ν(1 − ω(1 − β))
γb =
ν
ω + ν(1 − ω(1 − β))
where et is a cost-push shock that we have added. This shock can be interpreted as an
exogenous change in the desired wage and price markup as in Clarida et al (1999).
If d = 0 and ν = 0, we obtain the familiar forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve
since γb = 0 and γf = β. In this case current inﬂation is a function of the output-gap but
more important of expectations about future inﬂation. Note that as ν tends to one, γb doesnot tend to one. This may lead us to conclude that γf remains positive even when ν = 1.
This is of course just a false impression. In the limit, as ν tends to one, equation (19) in
fact collapses to an accelerationist Phillips curve with no forward-looking term.
2.2 The Diﬀerent New Keynesian Models
The model nests the diﬀerent speciﬁcations that we will be using in our analysis. We can
rewrite our model in terms of the output-gap. Denoting xt as the output-gap where the
latter is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between (log) output, y and the (log) natural level of
output yn
t . We obtain the following speciﬁcation4
xt = Et−dxt+1 −
1
σ
(Rt − Et−dπt+1) + ˜ ut (20)
πt = γfEt−dπt+1 + γbπt−1 + Et−d (κ(η + ϕ)xt + κγRt) + et (21)










[ξt − Et−dξt+1] + Et−dyn
t+1 − yn
t (24)
et = ρeet−1 + ǫe
t (25)
at = ρaat−1 + ǫa
t (26)
ξt = ρξξt−1 + ǫ
ξ
t (27)
Note that the disturbance ˜ ut, is a composite demand shock that depends on the preference
and productivity shocks.
2.3 Baseline and hybrid versions
When d = γb = γ = 0, we have the familiar forward-looking NK model with a forward-
looking NK Phillips curve and a forward-looking IS curve. On the other hand, when d =
γ = 0, 0 < γb,γf < 1, we obtain the hybrid NK Phillips curve where both forward and
backward-looking expectations about inﬂation are present.
2.4 Model with information lags
4When we have a cost channel in the model, the ﬂexible price level of output is also aﬀected by the
ﬂexible price level of the rate of interest. We assume that this is zero in the model with a cost channel.Although the baseline NK model assumes that output and inﬂation respond instantaneously
to changes in monetary policy, there is, however, ample empirical evidence from VARs that
monetary policy aﬀects output and inﬂation with considerable lags. The ﬁrst extension
to the baseline model we thus consider is a model with information delays. This model
is obtained by setting γ = 0 and d = 1. The microfoundations of the model with lags in
information are from Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (2003). The infor-
mation lag is modelled by assuming that pricing decisions by ﬁrms take one period to have
an eﬀect. The fraction of ﬁrms that are allowed to change their prices under Calvo pricing
must do so before the change takes eﬀect. Under this speciﬁcation, monetary policy does
not have a contemporaneous eﬀect on output and inﬂation.
2.5 Model with a cost channel
The second extension we consider is a cost-channel of monetary policy. The model with
the cost channel is obtained by setting d = 0 and γ = 1 in equations (20) and (21). The
microfoundations of the model with a cost channel we consider in this paper can be found
in Ravenna and Walsh (2006). In their model, monetary policy aﬀects inﬂation directly
since higher interest rates have a direct bearing on marginal cost which in turn inﬂuences
the inﬂation rate. One way to motivate the cost-channel is to assume that ﬁrms have to
pay workers before receiving the proceeds from the sale of their goods and thus they have
to borrow to settle their wage bill. In this case, monetary policy has a direct impact on the
wage bill of ﬁrms, thus on their marginal cost and hence on inﬂation.
Numerous papers have shown that the cost channel is quantitatively important in the
determination of inﬂation. For example, Barth and Ramey (2001) use industry level data
and show that interest rates have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on inﬂation through their
eﬀect on the marginal cost of ﬁrms. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) estimate a NK Phillips
curve with a cost channel using GMM and provide empirical evidence in favour of a cost
channel of monetary policy in the U.S.
2.6 Model with observational uncertainty - revisions in output and inﬂa-
tion
Many macroeconomic variables, most notoriously GDP, undergo important revisions over
time. These revisions are known to be quite large and frequent. Whether or not these
revisions can be forecastable is the subject of a growing literature on real-time data. Despitethe diﬃculty to model the exact nature of the revision process, economists tend to agree
that revisions of data do matter for the conduct of monetary policy and are large enough
to have real economic consequences. For example, one of the leading explanation for the
great inﬂation of the 1970s comes from Orphanides (2002) who argue that loose monetary
policy coupled with misperceptions about potential output led to the rise in inﬂation during
that period. We use a model where the central bank has accurate information about all the
variables in the economy but noisy information on output and inﬂation.
We use the hybrid NK model (0 < γb,γf < 1 and d = γ = 0) except that we assume that
the central bank has noisy information on output and inﬂation as they undergo revisions.
We assume that output and inﬂation are revised over a sequence of three periods.5 In
the fourth period, the “true value” of output is revealed. Since the data revisions are not
forecastable in this case, they are “news” to the policy-maker and the revisions are assumed
to be orthogonal to the forecast value of output. The revision process is given by:
(yo
t)





















t+3 = yt (31)
(πo
t)





















t+3 = πt (35)
where yt indicates the ﬁnal or true level of output and (yo
t)
t represents the initial observation
of output at time t (ﬁrst vintage of the data), (yo
t)
t+1 the revised estimate of time-t output
published at time t + 1, (second vintage of output), (yo
t)
t+2 the revised estimate of time-t
output published at time t + 2 (third vintage of output). The same principle applies to
inﬂation. The error terms θi,j where i = {1,2,3},j = {y,π} are the serially uncorrelated
measurement errors with mean zero and diagonal covariance matrix given by Σθi,j.
In this paper, we make the assumption that after three vintages, that is after three
quarters, the central bank observes the ﬁnal or true value of output. In reality, revisions
5This revision process is similar to Coenen, Levin and Wieland (2006) who investigate the role of money
as an information variable for monetary policy when there is uncertainty about the data. We have considered
revision process up to 8 periods. The results are qualitatively similar.can last for many more periods and technically continue forever given changes in deﬁnitions
and methodology.6 The pattern of revisions we choose is somehow rich enough, however,
to illustrate the importance of observational uncertainty on the stabilisation bias.
3 Optimal monetary policy
In the literature, monetary policy is often evaluated by a quadratic loss function that
depends on the variances of inﬂation and the output-gap. Woodford (2003) has shown that
such a loss function in a forward-looking NK model represents a second-order approximation
of the utility of a representative agent. The relative weights on inﬂation and output-gap






When expectations are completely forward-looking, the following loss function applies for
all the diﬀerent models, including the model with an information lag (see Woodford (2003),




where λx = κ
α
When rule-of-thumb producers are present, the loss function is given by
Lt = π2
t + λxxt + λπ(πt − πt−1)2 (37)
where λπ = ν
(1−ν)ω. This social welfare function is identical to that in Amato and Laubach
(2003). With the rule of thumb producers, the welfare function depends also on the variance
of the change in inﬂation. The central bank now cares not only about the volatility of
inﬂation relative to the output-gap but also about the volatility of the change in inﬂation.
Thus, the weight of inﬂation relative to the output-gap increases in the welfare function
with the presence of rule-of-thumb producers. Looking at equation (37), it is clear that
with a high value of α and a low value for κ, the weight that the central bank assigns to
the output-gap in its objective function is very small.
6Lam (2009) considers other types of data revision processes, notably one where the measurement errors
are serially correlated, reﬂecting the fact that the same vintage gets revised many times.Rather than proceeding directly to numerical solutions, we derive whenever possible
analytical results to obtain some intuition about the importance of commitment in these
diﬀerent models. Moreover, since analytical solutions cannot be derived in all cases and in
cases when the model features forward and backward-looking expectations, all the deriva-
tions that follow assume a completely forward-looking model. We rely on numerical simu-
lations to assess the importance of backward-looking expectations on the stabilisation bias
and to draw conclusions from our models.














subject to the forward-looking versions of equations (20) and (21) that is:
xt = Et−dxt+1 −
1
σ
(Rt − Et−dπt+1) + ut (39)
πt = βEt−dπt+1 + Et−d (κ(σ + ϕ)xt + κγRt) + et (40)














+  1t−d (πt − βπt+1 − κ(σ + ϕ)xt − κγRt)+
 2t−d(xt − xt+1 +
1
σ
(Rt − πt+1)) + tip
￿
where tip are terms independent of policy
Except for the case involving the cost channel (γ = 1), we can set the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the intertemporal IS,  2t−d to zero. We do not need the intertemporal IS
to solve for optimal policy when γ = 0 and we can use xt as the policy instrument.
3.1 Discretion
Under discretion, the optimization problem is equivalent to a period-by-period optimization
and since the central bank does not make any promises about the future, it cannot inﬂuence
the expectations of agents about inﬂation. Thus the optimization problem amounts to a
single period maximization of the objective function subject to the model. The ﬁrst-order
conditions are given by:
∂L
∂πt
= −πt +  1t−d = 0 (41)
∂L
∂xt
= −λxxt − κ(σ + ϕ) 1t−d +  2t−d = 0 (42)
∂L
∂Rt
= −κγ 1t−d −
1
σ
 2t−d = 0 (43)3.2 Commitment
On the other hand, under commitment, the central bank makes a promise about its future
actions. As a result, the future course of monetary policy is constrained (in a credible
way). This implies that the central bank, under commitment, will optimize once and for-all
taking the private sector expectations as given. The ﬁrst-order conditions under timeless
commitment are given by:
∂L
∂πt





 2t−d−1 = 0 (44)
∂L
∂xt





 2t−d−1 = 0 (45)
∂L
∂Rt
= −κ 1t−d −
1
σ
 2t−d = 0 (46)
Note that in the case of the model with predetermined expectations, we can also write the
ﬁrst-order conditions in terms of forecast conditional upon information at time t − 1.
3.3 Optimal policy in the baseline model
Optimal policy under discretion and commitment in the forward-looking NK model is easily
derived using the ﬁrst-order conditions above and setting the second Lagrange multiplier,





The condition implies that the central bank leans against the wind. An increase in inﬂation
above its target implies that the central bank should engineer a negative output-gap and




(xt − xt−1) (48)
Policy under commitment yields a superior outcome compared to discretion since it produces
an inertial response that improves the trade-oﬀ between the output-gap and inﬂation. Under
discretion, as shown in equation (47), the central bank’s optimal policy is to lean against
the wind by creating a negative output-gap to bring inﬂation back to equilibrium following
a cost-push shock. The central bank trades-oﬀ a bigger output-gap for lower inﬂation by
raising interest rates. It is clear from equation (47) that once the shock is over and inﬂation
is back to equilibrium, the central bank has no incentive to keep the output-gap negativeas this is costly in terms of welfare. This explains why optimal policy under discretion is
not inertial.
On the other hand, as equation (48) shows, optimal policy under commitment consists
of a credible promise to keep a negative output-gap, that is interest rates high, even after
the shock has passed. By responding to the change in the output-gap and not the level, the
central bank makes policy history-dependent and introduces an inertial response. Assuming
that the central bank does not have the temptation to renege once the shock is over, by
committing to keep the output-gap negative well beyond the life of the cost-push shock,
this policy has the immediate eﬀect of inﬂuencing inﬂation expectations and hence current
inﬂation as the former is an important determinant of current inﬂation in the model. As a
result, the central bank faces a better output-gap—inﬂation trade-oﬀ as a smaller decline
in the output-gap is needed to decreased inﬂation in the commitment case. Clearly, this
more favourable output-gap—inﬂation trade-oﬀ under commitment results in an overall
improvement in welfare.
3.4 Optimal policy in the model with information lags
When there is an information lag in the model, the optimal conditions under discretion and









(xt|t−1 − xt−1|t−2) (50)
where πt|t−1 denotes private-sector expectations of πt conditional on information available
at time t − 1. The optimal condition under discretion is the same as in the baseline case
except that the condition is determined as of date t − 1 instead of time t. This implies
that the central bank leans against the wind by trading-oﬀ bigger output-gap for lower
inﬂation but this time the central bank sets policy at time t − 1 to achieve its stabilisation
goals at time t. This change has an important implication for the discretionary outcome.
πt|t−1 and xt|t−1 in this case will be aﬀected by the past history of the exogenous shocks as
well by πt−1|t−2 and xt−1|t−2. As a result, policy under discretion, when the model has an
information lag, will feature some degree of inertia and history-dependence that is absent in
the baseline model. As a result, policy under discretion in this model will display the samekind of history-dependence that is usually found under commitment. This implies that the
stabilisation bias will be smaller in this case.
Moreover, compared to the baseline case, there is a key diﬀerence under commitment.
When expectations are predetermined, promises made in the current period cannot imme-
diately inﬂuence current and future values of output unless they are forecastable one period
in advance. This is made clear by equation (50), the optimal condition under commitment.
The change in the timing illustrates the inability of the central bank to aﬀect the public’s
expectations about future inﬂation and output-gap at the time of announcement. This
implies that the ability of the central bank to inﬂuence agents’ expectations, which is a key
reason why policy under commitment is superior to discretion in the ﬁrst place, is aﬀected
in the model with information delays. As a result the overall eﬀectiveness of commitment
is aﬀected, thereby also reducing the welfare gain from commitment.7
3.5 Optimal policy in the model with a cost channel
We derive optimal policy under discretion and commitment when the model has a cost-




















Some intuition on the consequences of the cost channel on the stabilisation bias can be
obtained by examining the optimal conditions under discretion. With the presence of the
cost channel, it is now more costly to stabilize inﬂation since changes in the policy rate
have a direct bearing on inﬂation. If we examine the ﬁrst-order conditions under discretion
of the baseline and the model with the cost channel, that is equations (51) and (47), it is
clear, that for a given change in the output-gap, inﬂation will react more when there is a
cost channel compared to the case where there is no cost channel since λ
κϕ > λ
κ(σ+ϕ).
The intuition for this result is fairly simple. In addition to the cost-push shock, the
presence of the cost channel, introduces an additional source of trade-oﬀ that the central
7Lam and Pelgrin (2004) show that this result depends on whether spending and pricing decisions are
predetermined to the same degree. They show that if pricing decisions are predetermined and not output,
the gains from commitment can be large. On the other hand, if output is predetermined and not inﬂation,
the gains from commitment are reduced. Kilponen and Leitemo (2007) also discuss the former result in their
paper.bank has to contempt with. It is more costly for the central bank to control inﬂation using
its policy instrument. As a result, discretionary policy, by not being able to exploit private
sector expectations about future inﬂation has to work even harder when there is a cost
channel. On the other hand, although the central bank under commitment has to face this
additional trade-oﬀ also, however, by appropriately inﬂuencing private sector expectations
about inﬂation and hence current inﬂation, the central bank reacts less aggressively, thereby
mitigating the impact of the cost channel on inﬂation. In short, with the cost channel, this
expectations channel becomes even more important, making commitment that much more
valuable. This result is similar to Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
The optimal commitment solution, although more diﬃcult to interpret, provides another
clue why the gains from commitment are larger in the presence of a cost channel compared to
the baseline case. Recall that one of the beneﬁts of commitment is that it introduces lagged
output as a state variable, thus making the system inertial and history-dependent. Equation
(52) reveals that the presence of the cost channel endogenizes the beneﬁts of commitment
even more since output and inﬂation in this case display additional persistence.
The presence of lagged inﬂation in the optimal solution under commitment imparts even
more inertia in the policy response of the central bank. Because of the history dependence
of inﬂation, the central bank has a bigger incentive to keep rates high for a long period of
time once they are increased. As a result, this policy action of the central bank increases the
importance of the expectations channel and the gains from commitment. This and the fact
that the outcome under discretion when there is a cost channel is less favourable, explains
why the gains from commitment are considerably larger in this case.
3.6 Optimal policy in the model with revisions in output and inﬂation
As outlined in Svensson and Woodford (2003), certainty equivalence continues to hold even
in the presence of unobservables since the optimal solution of the model is independent of
the stochastic shocks. As a result, we can apply the solution methods that we use in the
full information case. To gain an intuition on the eﬀects of the observational uncertainty
on the stabilisation bias, we assume that the central bank observes an imperfect measure
of output but has a perfect measure of inﬂation. In our present context, we assume there
is a single period revision to output and this revision follows an iid process. Thus we have:
yo
t = yt + θ
y
tWith both output and inﬂation being forward-looking variables in the model, the presence of
a measurement error in output introduces a signal extraction problem for the central bank.
This is because current inﬂation and output in the model depend respectively on current
expectations of future inﬂation, future output and also on the current level of policy. The
latter in addition to the current expectations of future inﬂation and future output, in turn,
depend also on the current level of inﬂation and output. This leads to a circularity problem
that the central bank has to deal with. As discussed in Svensson and Woodford (2003),
this circularity problem can be solved by treating the optimization problem and the signal
extraction problem faced by the central bank as separate.
When the central bank is faced with partial information on output, it can be shown
that optimal policy under discretion and commitment is the same as in the case of full
information except that the central bank now reacts to an eﬃcient estimate of the current
level of output which we denote by yt|t.8 Note that the central bank reacts to an optimal
estimate of actual output and not to the observed level of output.























Thus with a measurement error on output, optimal policy reacts to a noisy measure of
the output-gap also. Here also, the central bank leans against the wind under discretion.
However, with a measurement error in output, the central bank reacts to an optimal estimate
of the output gap and not to its actual value. This innocuous change is however not
benign and will aﬀect the stabilisation bias in an important manner. Since the optimal
estimate of current output and hence the output-gap will be a function of current and past
observations of current variables, policy under discretion will display more inertia compared
to the baseline case. In the latter case, policy under discretion reacts to current variables
only and is not history-dependent. On the other hand, with a measurement error on output,
policy under discretion becomes inertial. As a result, the stabilisation bias is aﬀected and
becomes smaller when the central-bank observes output (and inﬂation) with a noise.
8yt|t denotes the best estimate of yt given the information available at time t.With multi-period revisions in output and inﬂation, policy under discretion is likely to
display even more inertia, thus reducing the size of the stabilisation bias and the ineﬃciency
under discretion further. Based on these analytical results, however, it is diﬃcult to draw
any conclusions on how the discretionary outcome will be aﬀected as we vary the size of
the measurement error. We resort to numerical simulations to obtain an answer to this
question.
4 Numerical Simulations and Results
Since obtaining analytical results under commitment when the model have backward and
forward-looking expectations is prohibitively diﬃcult, we resort to numerical simulations to
evaluate the size of the stabilisation bias. The model can be written in state-space form and
we use the solution methods provided by Soderlind (1999) to solve for the model with no
measurement errors and those of Svensson and Woodford (2003) when the model features

























where Xt is a vector of predetermined variables, xt a vector of endogenous, forward-looking
variables, Rt the central bank’s policy instrument, Θ a vector of exogenous shocks hitting
the economy, Qt a vector of target variables and W a positive semideﬁnite matrix of weights
that the central bank assigns in its objective function. A is a (nxn) matrix containing the
structural parameters of the model, B is a (nx1) column vector, Cu, Cx and CR are matrices
of appropriate dimensions. The model is a standard linear stochastic problem with rational
expectations and forward-looking variables. The solution methods provided by Soderlind
(1999) can be applied to simulate the model.9
9Note that when we have the model with information lag, an expected future control term B1Rt+1|t
appears in the state-space. The linear stochastic problem can be easily accommodated to include the
expected future control term. See Svensson (2000) for example.When inﬂation and output are observed with a measurement error, we need to deﬁne












where θt is a vector of measurement errors. To solve the model with measurement errors we
use the theory discussed in Svensson and Woodford (2000) and the algorithms of Gerali and
Lippi (2003). The solution problem is similar to the certainty case except that estimates
of the state vector are now needed because of the presence of unobserved variables. The
optimal prediction for the unobservable state variables is computed by a Kalman ﬁlter. As
outlined in Svensson and Woodford (2003), certainty equivalence continues to hold since
the optimal solution of the model is independent of the stochastic shocks. Moreover, a
separation principle applies, since the optimization and the signal extraction problems faced
by the central bank are treated as separate problems.
4.1 Numerical values
To calibrate the model and perform our simulations, we assume the following values for the
parameters of the model: β, the discount factor is set to 0.99, the labour supply elasticity
ϕ is set to 1, ω, the fraction of ﬁrms that do not reset prices is set to 0.75, that is on
average, prices are assumed to be sticky for a period of three quarters. α, the elasticity of
substitution among goods is set to 6, σ, the relative risk aversion parameter is set to 1. We
allow ν the parameter that governs the proportion of ﬁrms that are rule of thumb to vary
between zero and one. The parameter γ which determines whether there is a cost channel
or not is set to zero when the model does not feature a cost channel and to one when the
cost channel is present.
We argued earlier that even as the proportion of rule of thumb producers, ν → 1, γf
does not tend to zero but remains positive while γb does not tend to one. Since we want
to analyze the gains from commitment when γb varies from zero (completely backward-
looking Phillips curve) to one (completely forward-looking Phillips curve), we make two
simpliﬁcations regarding the values that γb and γf take. First, we assume that γb and γf
sum to one. There are two justiﬁcations for this assumption. If we assume that β = 0.99,
ω equals 0.75, and if we allow ν to vary between 0 and 1, we ﬁnd that the sum of γb and
γf is always close to one. Moreover, to analyse the importance of backward versus forward-
looking expectations, we ﬁnd it more informative to simulate our model when these twocoeﬃcients sum to one. Second, in order to force γb to go to one when ν = 1, we assume
that γb = ν and thus γf = 1− ν. If we assume that ω=0.75 and β = 0.99, we ﬁnd that the
true value of γb is close to ν as long as the latter is less than 0.5. Finally, we ﬁx the value
of κ to 0.05 (a value commonly used in the literature) instead of allowing it to vary.
Regarding the shocks, the variance of the preference and cost-push shocks are both set to
0.015 while the variance of the technology shock is set to 0.03. The persistence parameters
ρe is set to 0.5 initially and ρa = ρξ equal 0.97. We provide some robustness tests by varying
the size of the persistence parameter as well as the size of the variance.
When data revisions are present, we assume that the variance of the measurement errors
for output is identical for the three periods and is equal to a ﬁfth of the variance of the
technology shock. The variance of the measurement errors for inﬂation is also assumed to
remain constant for the three periods and is set equal to a tenth of the variance of the
technology shock or half the size of the variance of the measurement errors on output. We
assume a bigger variance on the measurement errors for output compared to inﬂation since
there is evidence (see Croushore (2009) for example) that data revisions on output are
larger than those on CPI. We provide some robustness tests by allowing the variance of the
measurement errors to vary.
4.2 Results
The results of the simulations are presented in Figure 1. This ﬁgure shows the percentage
gain when the central bank commits rather than acts under discretion, that is the size of
the stabilisation bias. We obtain the following results:
(a) The size of the stabilisation bias, irrespective of the model utilized, increases as inﬂation
expectations become more forward-looking. The gains from commitment increase mono-
tonically as γf approaches one. This result is not new and has been well documented in
the literature and the intuition for this result is clear and has already been explained in the
introduction.
(b) The size of the stabilisation bias is zero when inﬂation expectations are completely
backward-looking, except in the model with the cost-channel. The intuition for this re-
sult comes from the presence of forward-looking consumers. Introducing the cost channel
increases the importance of forward-looking behaviour in a very direct way since current in-
ﬂation depends not only on expected inﬂation as in the standard New Keynesian framework,but also directly on the expected output-gap. This is illustrated by substituting equation
(20) in equation (21) :
πt = ((1 − γb) + κ)Etπt+1 + γbπt−1 + κγσEtxt+1 + κϕxt + κσut + et (59)
It is clear from equation (59) that even if price setting decisions are completely backward-
looking in the model with a cost channel, that is γb = 1, a stabilisation bias remains
since current inﬂation still depends on expected future outcome, thus making commitment
valuable. This result is similar in spirit to Leitemo, Røisland, and Torvik (2006), who
show that the stabilisation bias remains important in a model where the aggregate supply
function is completely backward-looking and the exchange rate is the only forward-looking
variable.
(c) The size of the stabilisation bias is considerably reduced when the baseline model is
modiﬁed to include an information lag. They are approximately 10% in the model with
an information lag compared to around 50% in the baseline model when inﬂation expec-
tations are forward-looking. The introduction of an information lag reduces the beneﬁts
of commitment. This is because when monetary policy aﬀects the economy with a lag,
policy-makers are less able to make promises to oﬀset shocks and thus it reduces eﬃcacy of
credible commitments.
Moreover, as discussed in section 3.4, policy under discretion in this case will be more
inertial compared to the baseline model. This is because optimal values for inﬂation and the
output-gap, when there is an information lag, depend on past observations of the exogenous
shocks and previous expected values of themselves. This display of history dependence under
discretion thus reduces the size of the stabilisation bias.
There is a third reason that might explain why the stabilisation bias is smaller in this
case. In a framework with information lags, the central bank can no longer perfectly insulate
the economy from demand shocks unless they are perfectly forecastable. It is well known
that commitment is valuable when the central bank faces shocks that imposes a trade-oﬀ
on society. On the other hand, when shocks such as demand and technology—that pose no
trade-oﬀ to society—become increasingly important as in the framework with information
lags, the need for commitment is greatly reduced. This result is, however, not entirely
obvious from our ﬁrst-order conditions.
(d) When the cost channel is introduced, the size of the stabilisation bias is greatly increased.
This result is intuitive. With the cost channel, stabilizing inﬂation is now more costly sincethe central bank faces a trade-oﬀ not only from the cost-push shock but also from the
presence of the cost channel itself. In the conventional NK model, to trade lower output
for lower inﬂation, the central bank increases interest rates. Lower inﬂation is achieved as
the output-gap shrinks.
With a cost channel, higher interest rates serve to shrink the output-gap but they also
have a direct bearing on inﬂation itself. The presence of the cost channel will thus partly
oﬀset any negative eﬀect higher interest rates will have on inﬂation. As a result, the central
bank will have to work harder to bring inﬂation down, thereby causing more volatility
in inﬂation itself. The bigger the cost channel, the stronger will be the direct eﬀect of
interest rates in inﬂation. Since it is now more costly for central banks to trade output-gap
movements for greater inﬂation stability, under discretion, the central bank will tend to
over-stabilize the output-gap and under-stabilize inﬂation even more, thereby exacerbating
the stabilisation bias. The ﬁrst-order conditions we derived earlier clearly illustrate this
point.
Commitment is very valuable in this case since by merely promising to keep rates high,
the central bank does not need to work as hard to bring inﬂation down. The size of the
trade-oﬀ that it faces is attenuated because the expectations channel is contributing to
the reduction of inﬂation. Thus the presence of the cost channel increases the gains from
commitment and hence the stabilisation bias.
(e) The stabilisation is reduced in the model with an unobservational uncertainty on output
and inﬂation. The loss function under discretionary policy in this case is around 25%
higher compared to the commitment case when inﬂation expectations are forward-looking.
When compared to the baseline case, the size of the stabilisation bias is reduced by about
half. As discussed in section 3.6, with noisy observations on output and inﬂation, the
central bank reacts to estimates of output and inﬂation. These estimates depend on current
observed variables but more importantly on past observations of current variables. Thus,
optimal policy under discretion in the presence of measurement errors depends not only on
contemporaneous variables but more importantly on past observations. As a result, policy
under discretion becomes inertial and will display the same kind of history-dependence
that is usually found under commitment. According to our numerical results, this has a
signiﬁcant reduction on the size of the stabilisation bias.
(f) In all models, as shown in Figures 2-4, we ﬁnd that the size of the stabilisation biasincreases as the cost-push becomes more persistent. This result is similar to Clarida et al.
(1999) and is fairly intuitive. As the cost-push shocks become more persistent, the ability of
the central bank to oﬀset the cost-push shocks is impeded. Making credible commitments
to lower inﬂation in the future becomes more valuable in this case since the central bank
can lower inﬂation without resorting to large increases in interest rates. This channel is
absent under discretion since the central bank cannot inﬂuence the expectations of agents
about inﬂation. As a result, the central bank faces a less favourable output-gap inﬂation
trade-oﬀ as the cost-push shock becomes more persistent, resulting in a larger stabilisation
bias.
(g) As shown in Figure 5, the size of the stabilisation bias decreases as the size of the
measurement errors increases. When the size of the measurement errors increase, the signal
extraction problem that the central bank faces gets more complicated and costly. In this
case, the central bank optimal reaction becomes even more inertial under discretion, further
reducing the size of the stabilisation bias and the ineﬃciency that arises under discretionary
policy. If this is the case, then the need for optimal delegation may be attenuated. This is
certainly a topic for future research.
5 Conclusions
How important is commitment in the NK model? According to our results, there are
signiﬁcant gains if the central bank can credibly commit. Except for the model where
there is a delayed response in monetary policy, we ﬁnd that for forward-looking inﬂation
expectations, the gains from commitment are large. All the other modiﬁcations we brought
to the baseline model indicate that there are signiﬁcant gains from commitment as long as
expectations are predominantly forward-looking. In the model with the cost-channel for
example, there is a 150% improvement in the welfare function from commitment, about
three times more compared to the baseline case. One of the main results of this paper is
that the gains from commitment depend on many factors and not just on the degree of
backward versus forward-looking expectations about inﬂation that many previous papers
have emphasized. Factors that accentuate the trade-oﬀ that the central bank faces, in
addition to the cost-push shock, actually increase the size of the stabilisation bias. On the
other hand, factors that reduce the eﬃcacy of commitment and that make promises less
valuable tend to decrease the size of the stabilisation bias. In future work, it would beinteresting to incorporate some of the features we discussed in this paper and estimate the
model. We may then get more information on the importance of each of these channels for
the stabilisation bias.
Figure 1: Size of stabilisation bias



































model with cost channel
model with information lag
model with data revisionsFigure 2: Size of stabilisation bias when the degree of serial correlation of the cost-push















































Figure 3: Size of stabilisation bias when the degree of serial correlation of the cost-push













































tFigure 4: Size of stabilisation bias when the degree of serial correlation of the cost-push
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